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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Steven Patrick Droogs appeals from his judgment of conviction for battery with the intent
to commit a serious felony. First, he challenges the district court’s decision to deny his motion
to suppress evidence obtained during his illegal detention, flight, and attic stand-off. Mindful
that Mr. Droogs sought to suppress evidence that was not derived from any exploitation of his
unlawful detention, he contends that the district court erred by denying his motion. Second, he
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of sixteen
years with six years fixed. This Court should vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the
order denying his motion to suppress, and remand for further proceedings. Alternatively, he asks
the Court to reduce his sentence as it sees fit.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Deputy Larsen stopped Mr. Droogs as he was walking down a rural road around 7 a.m.
on a cold, February morning, purportedly to see if Mr. Droogs needed any help. (R., pp.202–03.)
Mr. Droogs said he was fine and was just going to a friend’s house to return a cell phone.
(R., p.203.) Deputy Larsen persisted, offering to give Mr. Droogs a ride. (Id.) In response to
the officer’s prompts, Mr. Droogs gave Deputy Larsen a fake name and then submitted to a pat
down search for weapons, which Deputy Larsen claimed was needed before he allowed
Mr. Droogs in his car. (Id.) Just as Deputy Larsen started that pat down, Mr. Droogs ran away
and went inside a nearby house. (R., pp.203–04.) Mr. Droogs hid in the attic and refused
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officers’ orders for him to come out. (Tr.,1 p.63, L.17–p.67, L.10.) Eventually, Deputy Nelson
and his police dog, which was sent in to attack Mr. Droogs, were able to subdue him. (Tr., p.67,
L.17–p.70, L.1.) Officers removed Mr. Droogs from the house approximately three hours after
the standoff began. (R., p.204.)
The State charged Mr. Droogs with misdemeanor providing false information to a law
enforcement officer for giving Deputy Larsen the wrong name, and with misdemeanor
obstructing an officer and felony battery on an officer related to his refusal to leave the attic.
(R., pp.219–20.) It also alleged that he was a persistent violator. (R., pp.220–21.)
Mr. Droogs filed a motion to suppress all “statements, observations, evidence,
information or any other fruits obtained as a result of [his] detention, arrest, search, seizure, and
subsequent questioning.” (R., pp.129–30.) Mr. Droogs argued that Deputy Larsen illegally
detained him as he was walking down the road, and that although his flight was an intervening
circumstance, “Deputy Larsen’s misconduct was flagrant enough to warrant exclusion of
evidence discovered as a result of the stop.” (R., pp.145–51.) He also asserted that officers also
unlawfully seized Mr. Droogs by deploying the police dog.

(R., pp.151–56.)

The State

countered that Deputy Larsen was legitimately engaged in a community caretaking function and
thus did not illegally detain Mr. Droogs, that Deputy Larsen had reasonable suspicion to detain
Mr. Droogs after he ran away, and that the reasonableness of the officer’s use of the police dog
to subdue Mr. Droogs was not grounds for a motion to suppress. (R., pp.184–93.)
After a hearing, the court denied Mr. Droogs’ motion. (R., pp.203–15.) The Court
concluded that Deputy Larsen illegally detained Mr. Droogs “when he instructed him to come
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Unless otherwise indicated, citations to “Tr.” refer to the electronic document containing
transcripts of the October 30, 2017 motion to suppress hearing and the January 12, 2018
sentencing hearing.
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over to his patrol car and put his hands behind his back so that the deputy could grab onto them
while checking him for weapons.” (R., p.210.) But the court also held that “once he fled he was
no longer seized, but even if he was there is nothing to suppress.” (Id. (citing State v. Lusby,
146 Idaho 506, 509 (2008), for the proposition that “when a suspect responds to an
unconstitutional search or seizure by a physical attack on the officer, evidence of this new crime
is admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality”).) The court first explained that “[i]t is for the
moving party to identify evidence he or she requests the court to suppress—not for this Court to
guess,” and that the court was unable to identify any evidence to suppress. (R., pp.210–11.)
Next, it said that “if Droogs attempted to stretch the exclusionary rule from the temporary seizure
to his stand-off in the attic, the temporal proximity is too great with too many intervening
circumstances between them.” (R., p.214.) Finally, as for Mr. Droogs’ argument that the
officers used unreasonable force by deploying the police dog, the court concluded that was an
issue for the jury to decide and thus was not properly raised in a motion to suppress. (R., p.215.)
Mr. Droogs later entered an Alford plea to battery with the intent to commit a serious
felony, reserving his right to challenge the court’s denial of his motion to suppress on appeal.
(R., p.218; see generally 11/9/2017 Tr.) In exchange for his plea, the State agreed to recommend
a sentence of ten years fixed, plus ten years indeterminate, to run concurrently to Mr. Droogs’
sentence in an earlier case.2 (11/9/2017 Tr., p.6, Ls.15–17.)
At sentencing, the State recommended a unified twenty year term, with ten years fixed,
per the plea agreement. (Tr., p.88, L.22–p.89, L.1.) It justified that recommendation by pointing
to the “scenario that led up to the actual battery,” including “the conduct which essentially
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Mr. Droogs was on parole for involuntary manslaughter at the time of this offense. (PSI, pp.7–
9.)
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amounts to suicide by cop, the statements to Deputy Larsen about having a gun,” the attic
standoff itself, and Mr. Droogs’ criminal history. (Tr., p.89, L.11–p.90, L.18.)
Defense counsel asked for a unified sentence of five years, with three years fixed.
(Tr., p.94, L.23–p.95, L.1.) He told the court that Mr. Droogs was “not at all the person that I
saw in the reports.” (Tr., p.92, Ls.21–22.) He described Mr. Droogs as “very pleasant” and
“very intelligent,’ and said that he’d take a hundred clients like Mr. Droogs if he could.
(Tr., p.92, L.22–p.93, L.7.) He explained that Mr. Droogs took responsibility for his actions, but
also asked the court to recognize that none of this would have happened if Deputy Larsen hadn’t
unlawfully detained Mr. Droogs. (Tr., p.93, Ls.7–18.) Defense counsel also discussed the
positive steps Mr. Droogs had taken since he was paroled, including moving away from bad
influences in Lewiston and getting involved in Narcotics Anonymous. (Tr., p.93, L.20–p.94,
L.6.)
After concluding that Mr. Droogs was a danger to society, the district court sentenced
him to a unified term of sixteen years, with six years fixed. (Tr., p.98, L.23–p.100, L.23;
R., pp.228–29.) Mr. Droogs timely appealed. (R., pp.230–32.)
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ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Droogs’ motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Droogs to a unified term
of sixteen years, with six years fixed, for battery with the intent to commit a serious
felony?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Droogs’ Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment protects the people’s right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 17; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655 (1961) (the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment). Evidence that the State obtains in violation of these constitutional
protections is generally excluded from a prosecution of the victim of the violation. State v. Page,
140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963). This rule
applies to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and evidence discovered
through the exploitation of the original illegality. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846 (2004); Wong Sun,
371 U.S. at 484–85. The ultimate question is thus “whether the police acquired the evidence
from ‘exploitation of [the] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.’” State v. Bigham, 141 Idaho 732, 734 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting United
States v. Green, 111 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 1997); Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
According to the attenuation doctrine, evidence is admissible “when the connection
between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by
some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that
has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” State v.
Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017) (quoting Utah v. Strieff, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016)).
When determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated, courts consider the
totality of the circumstances, including “(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the
acquisition of the evidence, (2) the occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the
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flagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement action.” Id. at 771–72 (quoting Page,
140 Idaho at 846); see also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603–04 (1975).
“Our law requires citizens to endure even an unlawful arrest without resorting to force or
self-help, on the ground that the indignity and inconvenience if the arrest turns out to be
improper are less serious than the injuries engendered by encouraging citizens to make their own
snap judgments and take the law into their own hands.” State v. Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547,
551 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Wayne R. LaFave, 1 SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.13(a) (2d ed. 1987));
see also Padilla v. State, 161 Idaho 624, 627 (2016) (holding that the totality of the
circumstances showed the officer had reasonable suspicion to detain Padilla because, when the
officer saw Padilla walking down an alley at night, turned on his overhead lights, and got out of
his patrol car, Padilla took off running between two houses). “It appears to be a nearly universal
rule in American jurisdictions that when a suspect responds to an unconstitutional search or
seizure by a physical attack on the officer, evidence of this new crime is admissible
notwithstanding the prior illegality.” State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2008).
“Because there has been no exploitation of the officer’s unconstitutional conduct,” in such a
situation, “the purpose of the exclusionary rule—to deter police misconduct—would not be
advanced by suppressing evidence” of the new crime. Id. at 510 (holding that “evidence of
Lusby’s alleged battery on an officer or other forceful resistance is not suppressible. The officers
did not derive evidence of this new criminal conduct from any exploitation of the unlawful
entry.”); see also State v. Deisz, 145 Idaho 826, 831 (Ct. App. 2008) (“the causal connection
between the allegedly unlawful police entry and the acquisition of the evidence of Deisz’s
violent attack which immediately followed that entry was broken, and the exclusionary rule does
not require suppression of the evidence. A contrary ruling ‘would effectively give the victim of
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police misconduct carte blanche to respond with any means, however violent.’”) (internal
citation omitted).
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. This Court accepts the trial
court’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts. Page, 140 Idaho at 843 (citing State v.
Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 161 (2000)).
Mindful that Mr. Droogs sought to suppress evidence that was not derived from the
exploitation of his unlawful detention, see Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484–85; Cohagan, 162 Idaho
at 721; Lusby, 146 Idaho at 509; Deisz, 145 Idaho at 831; Padilla, 161 Idaho at 627, he
nevertheless contends that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. As found
by the district court, Deputy Larsen illegally detained Mr. Droogs “when he instructed him to
come over to his patrol car and put his hands behind his back so that the deputy could grab onto
them while checking him for weapons.” (R., p.210.) And although Mr. Droogs’ flight was an
intervening circumstance, “Deputy Larsen’s misconduct was flagrant enough to warrant
exclusion of evidence discovered as a result of the stop.” (R., pp.145–51.) Indeed, it was
Deputy Larsen’s decision to unlawfully detain Mr. Droogs which set off the chain of events
leading to Mr. Droogs’ arrest and prosecution. Therefore, the court should have suppressed all
“statements, observations, evidence, information or any other fruits obtained as a result of the
detention, arrest, search, seizure, and subsequent questioning” of Mr. Droogs. (R., pp.129–30.)
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Droogs To Sixteen Years, With
Six Years Fixed, For Battery With The Intent To Commit A Serious Felony
When a defendant challenges his sentence as excessively harsh, this Court will conduct
an independent review of the record, taking into account “the nature of the offense, the character
of the offender, and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834
(2011). The Court reviews the district court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion,
which occurs if the district court imposed a sentence that is unreasonable, and thus excessive,
“under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002); State v.
Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to
accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related
goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834.
Mr. Droogs’ sentence is excessive in light of the mitigating evidence in this case. First,
Mr. Droogs’ background, including his upbringing, substance use, and criminal history, sheds
light on this offense. His parents were “raging alcoholics” and drug users. (PSI, p.9.) Growing
up in that environment, Mr. Droogs became a user himself. (PSI, pp.12–13.) He first used
marijuana at just four years of age, and started using harder drugs as a teenager. (Id.)
Mr. Droogs brings with him a handful of felony offenses and roughly twenty years of
incarceration. (PSI, pp.5–9, Tr., p.91, L.14–p.92, L.9.) He was on parole for an involuntary
manslaughter charge for killing a friend of his in Lewiston when this offense took place. (PSI,
p.7.) Recognizing the toll his past criminal actions have taken on both his life and the lives of
others, Mr. Droogs wants to keep on the straight and narrow. (PSI, p.14.)
Mr. Droogs got drug treatment during his last period of incarceration, but relapsed when
he was released and moved back to Lewiston, where he was confronted with constant reminders
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of having killed his friend and also with old friends who were themselves users. (PSI, pp.8–9,
13.) Mr. Droogs acknowledges that his drug use is a problem in his life, he wants to stop using
drugs, and he wants to take advantage of drug treatment. (PSI, p.13.)
Next, Mr. Droogs’ accountability and remorse stands in mitigation. As he told the court
at sentencing:
Your Honor, I could have handled myself considerably better that day. I know
that I made some really dumb absent-minded decisions, and there’s no excuses for
it. I don’t try to pretend to make excuses for me. I wish I would have acted in a
more mature manner.
There’s things that I don’t agree with what was said and what was, but the
facts are that I acted in a manner that wasn’t productive and wasn’t, you know,
wasn’t—I wasn’t mature, let me just put it way, and I value maturity. And I
apologize. If I had done anything to harm anybody or put anybody at risk, then I
apologize. I never meant, when I started that day off, to put anybody in a bad
spot.
(Tr., p.97, L.15–p.98, L.3.)
Finally, Mr. Droogs’ motivation to become a productive, law-abiding member of society
and his goals for the future favor a lower sentence. He told the presentence investigator,
I have spent a great deal of time pondering all the possibilities that could still “be”
with the remainder of my life. What I’ve come to understand and know is I am
not a complete waist [sic]. The ironic aspect is I had spend [sic] a great deal of
my life apon waisting [sic] time on lost causes that have proven harmful to others
as well to myself. I am begging the courts to see through my shortcomings and
help me rather than throw me away.
(PSI, p.14.) Similarly, he told the court at sentencing,
I just implore, please, that I’m—my life isn’t a waste. It isn’t. I’m
intelligent enough to make better decisions. And if you gave me the opportunity,
I know I would do the right thing.
(Tr., p.98, Ls.4–7.) Mr. Droogs told the presentence investigator that he wants to figure out how
to be productive and free in society, and that spending so much time in prison, as well as relapses
and old associates and environments, have hampered his ability to reach his goals. (PSI, p.14.)
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He knows that, to be successful out in society, he will need, “[e]mployment, housing, a solid
support system, [and] someone to help me navigate the world of today verses yesterdays.” (Id.)
He also readily acknowledges that he doesn’t have all of the answers—he is open to learning
whatever might be helpful to him in the future. (Id.) He just knows he doesn’t want to continue
to make the same mistakes, and does not want to spend “all of [his] middle age years
incarcerated.” (Id.) In light of these mitigating factors, Mr. Droogs’ sentence of sixteen years,
with six years fixed, for battery with the intent to commit a serious felony was excessive.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Droogs respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgement of conviction, reverse
the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand his case for further proceedings.
Alternatively, he requests that the Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 10th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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